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1 Introduction
The last four chapters of Davidson’s posthumously published book, Truth and
Predication, are devoted to what he calls the problem of predication.
The problem encompasses a metaphysical question – “How are particulars
related to universals?” (Davidson 2005, 77), and a semantic one – “How are
names or other singular terms related to predicates?” (Davidson 2005, 77).
Davidson follows the recent tendency of concentrating on the semantic
problem.
After discussing the nature of the problem, Davidson goes on to provide
a historical survey of attempts to solve it. He ends by presenting his own
solution. Davidson’s historical survey has a big gap, jumping from Russell
directly to Strawson, thereby omitting Wittgenstein’s contribution to the
debate. The reason why Wittgenstein is left out is not that Davidson doesn’t
ﬁnd his ideas worth discussing. He explains the omission in a note on the
manuscript added by the editors as a footnote:
My decision not to talk about Wittgenstein’s view needs a comment. The reason is
simply that try as I may I cannot satisfy myself that I have a sufﬁciently justiﬁed opinion
what his views on predication were. I lament my failure here (as no doubt elsewhere) to
ﬁll in an important piece of the picture. (Davidson 2005, 140)
In fact, the gap in Davidson’s coverage starts just before Wittgenstein, leaving
out, apart from some passing remarks, Russell’s contribution after he aban-
doned the dual-relation theory of judgment in favour of the multiple-relation
theory. Since then, Davidson tells us, “Russell did not return to the question of
the unity of the proposition, since on the new theory there were no propositions
left” (Davidson 2005, 107).
This is an unfortunate gap. I believe, and I hope to show here, that the
exchanges between Russell and Wittgenstein, in the two years that
Wittgenstein spent in Cambridge working with Russell, constitute one of the
I am grateful to Fraser MacBride for his comments on this material.
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most interesting episodes of the history of the problem. My main goal in this
chapter is to outline the main ideas to emerge from these exchanges regarding
the problem of predication, in its metaphysical and semantic forms. I will close
by discussing the nature of Davidson’s own solution to the problem.
2 The Metaphysical Problem
The bulk of Davidson’s discussion of the problem of predication deals with the
semantic version, but he also devotes some attention to its metaphysical form.
He presents it in the following passage:
Theaetetus sits. Theaetetus, we agree, is an entity, a person. He is sitting. The property of
Sitting is another entity, this time a universal that can be instantiated by many particular
entities. In the present case, Theaetetus is one of those entities. In other words, we explain
what it is for it to be the case that Theaetetus sits by saying that Theaetetus instantiates the
property of Sitting. The fact itself doesn’t, then, consist merely of the two entities,
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting. It is a fact because those two entities stand in
a certain relation to each other, the relation of Instantiation […] Nowwe see that a fact we
can describe in just two words apparently involves three entities. But can ‘Theaetetus sits’
consist of just the three entities, Theaetetus, Sitting, and Instantiation? Surely not. The fact
requires as well that these three entities stand in a certain relation to one another.
To explain this fact we need to mention this fourth entity, which, unlike instantiation, is
a three-place relation. We are clearly off on an inﬁnite regress. (Davidson 2005, 85)
As Tyler Burge has pointed out, Davidson often blurs the distinction between
the metaphysical and the semantical problem (Burge 2007, 589–90). This
passage, for example, is presented as an attempt ‘to understand the structure
and nature of judgments’ (Davidson 2005, 85). I agree with Burge that the two
problems should be treated separately. I want to start in this section by
considering the metaphysical problem, treating the quoted passage as expres-
sing Davidson’s views on this.
In Davidson’s presentation, the problem concerns an explanation of ‘what it
is for it to be the case that Theaetetus sits’. On this explanation, the fact is
a compound, with a particular, Theaetetus, and a universal, the property of
Sitting, as its constituents. The problem arises for the contention that these are
the only constituents of the fact. The mere coexistence of Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting doesn’t produce the fact. The fact that Theaetetus sits could
fail to obtain even if both Theaetetus and the property of Sitting exist. In order
for the fact to obtain, the particular has to be connected with the universal in the
way that we call instantiation – Theaetetus needs to instantiate the property of
Sitting. But this seems to amount to the admission that the fact that Theaetetus
sits has, not two constituents, but three. In addition to Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting, we also need to count the (binary) relation of Monadic
Instantiation as one of its constituents.
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But if this is right, the same line of reasoning can be applied to the current
hypothesis concerning the composition of the fact that Theaetetus sits.
The mere coexistence of Theaetetus, the property of Sitting and the relation
of Monadic Instantiation doesn’t produce the fact. The three items need to be
connected with one another in the way that we call binary instantiation –
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting (in that order) need to instantiate
Monadic Instantiation. But this brings in an additional constituent to our
analysis of the fact that Theaetetus sits. In addition to Theaetetus, the property
of Sitting, and the relation of Monadic Instantiation, we also need to count the
(ternary) relation of Dyadic Instantiation as a constituent of the fact. And since
the reasoning can be repeated at each stage, we never reach a satisfactory
account of the composition of the fact that Theaetetus sits.1
On this construal, then, the target of the argument is the application to the
fact that Theaetetus sits of an account of facts according to which they are
composite items, produced by the combination of particulars and universals.
I am going to refer to this as the Compositional Account of Facts (CAF).
The regress argument, on the construal that we are extracting from
Davidson’s passage, would refute any account of the structure of the fact that
Theaetetus sits that an advocate of CAF might put forward.
Let’s consider in some detail how the argument would proceed, on this
construal, focusing in the ﬁrst instance on the most natural application of
CAF to the fact that Theaetetus sits:
A1. The fact that Theaetetus sits is a compound with exactly two components:
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting.
We will have a refutation of A1 if we can show that it entails its negation. For
this purpose we assume A1 and try to show that Not-A1 follows from this
assumption. A1 entails that Theaetetus and the property of Sitting are among
the components of the fact that Theaetetus sits. But for the fact to be produced,
these two items have to be combined in a certain way – the former has to
instantiate the latter, and it follows from this thatMonadic Instantiation also has
to be a constituent of the fact. Hence Theaetetus and the property of Sitting are
not the only two components of the fact that Theaetetus sits. Since A1 entails its
negation, A1 stands refuted, as desired. The reasoning from A1 to Not-A1
would have the following structure:
A1. (assumption)
B1. The fact that Theaetetus sits is a compound with Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting among its components. (from A1)
C1. The fact that Theaetetus sits wouldn’t obtain unless Theaetetus instan-
tiated the property of Sitting. (from B1)
1 A similar difﬁculty would arise if we construed Instantiation as a single, multigrade relation.
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D1. Monadic Instantiation is also a component of the fact that Theaetetus sits.
(from C1)
Not-A1. (from D1)
This inference form A1 to Not-A1 is supposed to refute A1 – a speciﬁc account
of the structure of the fact that Theaetetus sits. The advocate of CAF might at
this point replace A1 with a different account of the composition of the fact that
Theaetetus sits:
A2. The fact that Theaetetus sits is a compound with exactly three compo-
nents: Theaetetus, the property of Sitting and the relation of Monadic
Instantiation.
But another application of the same line of reasoning would show that A2
entails its negation:
A2. (assumption)
B2. The fact that Theaetetus sits is a compound with Theaetetus, the property
of Sitting and the relation ofMonadic Instantiation among its components.
(from A2)
C2. The fact that Theaetetus sits wouldn’t obtain unless Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting instantiated the relation of Monadic Instantiation.
(from B2)
D2. Dyadic instantiation is also a component of the fact that Theaetetus sits.
(from C2)
Not-A2. (from D2)
And the same strategy can be used to refute any subsequent proposal as to how
CAF can construe the fact that Theaetetus sits. It follows that there is no viable
account of the fact that Theaetetus sits along the lines of CAF. In general, CAF
cannot provide a viable account of facts.2
Is this line of reasoning sound? Let’s focus on the purported refutation of A1.
B1 is a logical consequence of A1. The inference from B1 to C1 strikes me as
unassailable. If we construe the fact that Theaetetus sits as a compound, the
production of the fact will require that its constituents are combined with one
another in the right sort of way.
The point at which the argument is vulnerable is the transition from C1 to
D1 – from the claim that Theaetetus would need to instantiate the property of
Sitting in order for the fact to be produced to the claim that Monadic
Instantiation has to be a constituent of the fact. In order to underwrite this
inference, we need a principle along the following lines:
CONS. If an entity E is implicated in the constitution of a fact F, then E is a constituent
of F.
2 Provided, that is, that we rule out a construal of facts as compounds with inﬁnitely many
constituents.
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In the presence of CONS, the inference from C1 to D1 is unstoppable, but if
CONS can be rejected, the refutation of A1 can be resisted at this point.
This is the line taken by Bertrand Russell, just at the point at which Davidson
interrupts his historical survey. According to Russell, every complex must have
what he calls a form, which is the way in which the constituents of the complex
are put together. Forms, for Russell, are real entities, not mere abstractions.
However, they are not constituents of the complexes whose forms they are, and
this, precisely, in order to avoid the regress we are discussing here. He
expresses the point in the following passage of the manuscript ‘What is
Logic?’, of 1912:
In a complex, there must be something, which we may call the form, which is not
a constituent, but the way the constituents are put together. If we made this a constituent,
it would have to be somehow related to the other constituents, and the way in which it
was related would really be the form; hence an endless regress. Thus the form is not
a constituent. (Russell 1992, 55)3
Since Russell’s complexes include facts, Russell is here rejecting CONS. He
accepts that forms are implicated in the production of complexes, but he refuses
to treat them as their constituents.
Once we reject CONS, the argument against CAF can be easily blocked.
We will be able to recognise the involvement of Monadic Instantiation in the
constitution of the fact that Theaetetus sits without contradicting A1. Three
entities will be involved in the constitution of the fact – its two constituents and
the way in which they are put together, Monadic Instantiation, which is not
a constituent. Advocates of CAF who are prepared to follow Russell in reject-
ing CONS, have nothing to fear from this version of the regress argument.
Now, if the fact that Theaetetus sits obtains, there will also be the fact that
Theaetetus instantiates the property of Sitting. This fact will have Theaetetus,
the property of Sitting and the relation of Monadic Instantiation as its consti-
tuents. These constituents will be put together by Dyadic Instantiation, which
will not be a constituent of this fact. And in the same way we can describe an
inﬁnite sequence of ever more complex facts, all of which will obtain just in
case the fact that Theaetetus sits obtains:
F1. S(t)
F2. ∈1(S,t)
F3. ∈2(∈1,S,t)
F4. ∈3(∈2,∈1,S,t)
…
But all of these facts will be different from one another, not conﬂicting
accounts of the structure of one and the same fact, as required by the argument
3 See also Russell (1984, 98).
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against CAF. Furthermore, by accepting that on her account every fact brings
an inﬁnite sequence of facts of this kind in its train, the advocate of CAF
wouldn’t be accepting that her position is invalidated by an inﬁnite regress.
Burge puts the point well: “Such an inﬁnity is profusion, not circularity or
regress” (Burge 2007, 592).
So far I have argued that the version of the regress argument that I have
extracted fromDavidson’s passage fails to put genuine pressure on CAF, unless
it is supplemented by a cogent defence of CONS. I want to explore next
a different version of the argument that doesn’t make it depend on CONS.
A clue to the construal that I want to consider is given by Burge, in the
continuation of the passage I’ve just quoted: “Circularity and regress are
properties of explanations—of certain representational structures—not of
ordinary facts or subject matters” (Burge 2007, 592). The point concerns the
sequence of facts, F1, F2… I have just argued that CAF is not undermined by
the admission that the obtaining of F1 entails the obtaining of the inﬁnitely
many facts in the sequence. Using this sequence in a cogent regress argument
against CAFwould require showing that there is a phenomenon that CAF needs
to explain but any attempt to provide this explanation produces a never-ending
chain involving this sequence. This is the line that I want to explore next.
Suppose that, as a matter of fact, Theaetetus sits. Now, the existence of
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting doesn’t entail that Theaetetus sits.
Consider, then, a possible state of the world in which both Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting exist, but Theaetetus doesn’t sit. Call this the ET-alternative
(for Erect Theaetetus). Which difference between actuality and the ET-
alternative explains the fact that Theaetetus sits in the former but not in the
latter? According to CAF, the fact that Theaetetus sits is a compound, with
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting as its constituents. The constituents exist
in the ET-alternative, but the fact doesn’t obtain. Why is this?
Clearly the answer that CAFwould give to this question is that in actuality, but
not in the ET-alternative, Theaetetus and the property of Sitting are combined in
the requisite way – the former instantiates the latter. So according to CAF, the
reason why the fact that Theaetetus sits obtains in actuality but not in the ET-
alternative is that Theaetetus instantiates the property of Sitting in actuality and
not in the ET-alternative. This explanans invokes a fact – the fact that Theaetetus
instantiates the property of Sitting – that obtains in actuality but not in the ET-
alternative. This fact, as we have learnt in our discussion of the previous version
of the argument, should not be treated as identical with the fact in the explanan-
dum. The relation of Monadic Instantiation is a constituent of the fact that
Theaetetus instantiates the property of Sitting, but not of the fact that
Theaetetus sits. What is happening is that the ﬁrst fact in our inﬁnite sequence,
F1, is being explained in terms of the second fact in the sequence, F2.
The difference between actuality and the ET-alternative that explains why
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F1 is present in the former but not in the latter is that another fact, F2, is present in
the former but not in the latter.
This can’t be the end of the story. CAF can’t treat the fact that F2 is present
in actuality but not in the ET-alternative as a brute difference between the two
situations. F2 is a fact. Hence, according to CAF, it is a compound. But its
constituents – Theaetetus, the property of Sitting and the relation of Monadic
Instantiation – are also present in the ET-alternative, in which F2 doesn’t
obtain. So far, we’ve been told that the reason why the F1-compound is
present in actuality but not in the ET-alternative is that the F2-compound is
present in actuality but not in the ET-alternative. Until we have an explanation
of why the F2-compound is present in actuality but not in the ET-alternative,
we won’t have a satisfactory account of the difference between actuality and
the ET-alternative that explains why F1 is present in the former but not in the
latter.
But clearly this line of reasoning launches us on an inﬁnite regress.
The reason why F2 is present in actuality but not in the ET-alternative is that
its constituents are combined in the right sort of way – that Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting instantiate Monadic Instantiation. This amounts to explain-
ing why F2 is present in actuality and not in the ET-alternative in terms of the
fact that F3 is present in the former but not in the latter … At no point in this
sequence of explanations will CAF offer a satisfactory account of why F1 is
present in actuality and not in the ET-alternative. CAF has failed to identify the
difference between these situations that explains why one contains F1 and the
other one doesn’t.
Needless to say, this brief sketch doesn’t amount to a cogent refutation of
CAF, but it does suggest that the difﬁculty is not removed by Russell’s idea that
what combines the constituents of a fact into a unit is not itself a constituent.
This is not the place to continue this dialectic.What I’d like to do before leaving
the metaphysical version of the problem of predication is to outline brieﬂy two
alternatives to CAF for which the problem might not arise.
One alternative metaphysical picture is the Aristotle-inspired view that the
fundamental constituents of the world are not particulars or universals, but
a type of entity combining the two – not Theaetetus, on the one hand, and the
properties that he instantiates, on the other, but a single entity incorporating
Theaetetus and all his properties. On this view, the fact that Theaetetus sits
wouldn’t be a compound of a multiplicity of components, but an aspect of this
unitary whole.4 I don’t propose to discuss this approach in any detail here.
I only want to point out that even if we accept that the view provides
4 Davidson ascribes to Aristotle the view that ‘if the forms are to serve as universals, then they
cannot be separate from the entities of which they are properties’ (Davidson 2005, 89), but not
the ontology of ‘thick particulars’ that I have sketched here. I am not claiming that the ‘Aristotle-
inspired view’ was actually held by Aristotle.
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a satisfactory account of subject-predicate facts, relational facts might still pose
a problem. Suppose that Theaetetus with all his properties is a single funda-
mental unit, and Socrates with all his properties another. It’s hard to see what
account we can provide with these materials of, say, the fact that Theaetetus
criticises Socrates. For relational facts we seem forced to return to the concep-
tion of facts as compounds, facing once again the metaphysical version of the
problem of predication.
The second alternative to CAF that I want to consider is a metaphysical
picture that takes as fundamental items, not particulars and universals, like
CAF, or the particular-cum-universal units of the Aristotelian view, but facts.
Facts on this approach are the ultimate, simple constituents of reality, with
particulars and universals construed as abstractions from these – as what we see
the fact that Theaetetus sits as having in common with the fact that Theaetetus
eats, or with the fact that Socrates sits. The approach has been eloquently
characterised by Kenneth Olson as
the view that—contrary to what language would lead us to believe—the sort of thing
expressed by a whole sentence is metaphysically more basic than some of the things
expressed by the words making it up. (Olson 1987, 40)
And, as I have argued elsewhere (Zalabardo 2015, Ch. 4), this is themetaphysical
approach put forward inWittgenstein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1974). This fact-
based ontology is, precisely, what the opening sentences of the book express:
1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
This is not the standard interpretation of the metaphysics of the Tractatus,
but it’s certainly not without advocates. It received an early endorsement from
Brian Skyrms:
Wittgenstein’s truly daring idea was that the ontology of the subject (nominalism) and
the ontology of the predicate (Platonism) were both equally wrong and one-sided; and
that they should give way to the ontology of the assertion.Wemay conceive of the world
not as a world of individuals or as a world of properties and relations, but as a world of
facts—with individuals and relations being equally abstractions from the facts. John
would be an abstraction from all facts-about-john; Red an abstraction from being-red-
facts; etc. (Skyrms 1981, 199)5
The point is not simply that particulars and universals cannot occur in isolation,
but only in the context of states of affairs. The claim is rather that, for
Wittgenstein, particulars and universals are ultimately nothing but features of
states of affairs – John is what the states of affairs that we characterise as
involving John have in common, and redness what the states of affairs that we
5 See also McCarty (1991).
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characterise as involving redness have in common.6 I think this is a very
plausible reading of the Tractatus, but a defence of this point would require
a more extensive discussion of the interpretation of the book than we can
undertake in this chapter. Hence we will have to restrict ourselves to
a conditional conclusion: if this reading is right, as I think it is, then
Wittgenstein doesn’t face the metaphysical version of the problem of predica-
tion. Wittgenstein doesn’t have to provide an explanation of how facts arise
from the combination of their components because he doesn’t think that facts
are produced by a process of combination. On the contrary, facts are ultimate,
indivisible units of his ontology, in which what we think of as constituents of
facts are treated as mere abstractions.
3 The Semantic Problem
I want to turn now to the semantic version of the problem of predication.
The sentence “Theaetetus sits” represents things as being a certain way,
which may or may not coincide with the way things are. How does the sentence
achieve this? The most promising strategy for answering this question is to
explain the power of the sentence to represent the world in terms of the
semantic properties of its constituents – the singular term ‘Theaetetus’ and
the predicate ‘sits’. The semantic version of the problem of predication is to
understand how the semantic properties of its constituents enable a sentence to
represent the world as being a certain way. On the assumption that the role of
singular terms is relatively clear, the problem is seen as concerning, speciﬁ-
cally, how the semantic properties of predicates can give rise to the representa-
tional power of the sentences in which they ﬁgure.
Russell faced a version of the problem in his theories of judgment.
Judgments, for Russell, are mental episodes in which we represent the world
in consciousness as being a certain way. With his theories of judgment, Russell
sought to explain how the mind is related to the world when we judge. A crucial
challenge for this enterprise is posed by the fact that judgments can be false as
well as true. This circumstance blocks an account according to which in
a judgment the mind is related to a fact. The proposal would not work for
false judgments. I can judge that Theaetetus ﬂies, but my doing so cannot
consist in a relation between me and the fact that Theaetetus ﬂies, since there is
no such fact.
Russell’s ﬁrst strategy for overcoming this obstacle was to postulate a range
of entities to act as what I am related to when I judge falsely, in the same way in
which I am related to a fact when I judge truly. He referred to these items as
6 The position I am attributing to Wittgenstein is akin to versions of trope theory that construe
particulars and universals as bundles of tropes. See, e.g., Bacon (1995).
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objective non-facts, and to facts and objective non-facts together as proposi-
tions. The view that judgment is a relation between the mind and a proposition,
in this sense, is, in a nutshell, Russell’s dual-relation theory of judgment.
But by 1910 Russell had abandoned this strategy and had replaced it with an
alternative approach that takes advantage of the resources of CAF. On the new
approach, there isn’t a single item to which my mind is related when I judge.
On the contrary, my mind is related to a multiplicity of items – the constituents
of the fact that would have to obtain in order for my judgment to be true. When
I judge that Theaetetus sits, mymind is related to Theaetetus and to the property
of Sitting; when I judge that Theaetetus ﬂies, my mind is related to Theaetetus
and to the property of Flying. My judgment that Theaetetus sits is true because
there is a fact with Theaetetus and the property of Sitting as its constituents.
My judgment that Theaetetus ﬂies is false because there isn’t a fact with
Theaetetus and the property of Flying as its constituents. This is the central
thought of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment.
This basic idea had to be reﬁned in several ways before it could provide
a satisfactory theory, and between 1910 and 1913 Russell endorsed, in quick
succession, several versions of the view. One of the challenges that precipitated
these changes was the problem of order, or direction. On the multiple-relation
theory, when Othello judges that Desdemona loves Casio, his mind is related to
Desdemona, Casio, and the relation of Love. But we can’t say that Othello’s
judgment is true just in case there is a fact with Desdemona, Casio, and the
relation of Love as its constituents. Casio loving Desdemona would be a fact
with these constituents, but we wouldn’t want to say that the obtaining of this
fact would sufﬁce for making Othello’s judgment true.
What matters for our purposes is a different challenge faced by the theory,
one that Russell didn’t fully grasp until the 1913 manuscript entitled Theory of
Knowledge.7 The problem arises from the fact that bringing to consciousness
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting does not sufﬁce for judging that
Theaetetus sits. A mental episode in which I bring these two items to con-
sciousness might fail to represent things as being a certain way. In particular, it
might fail to represent Theaetetus as sitting.
In Theory of Knowledge, the issue is discussed in its application, not to
judgment, but to understanding – in our example, to the understanding of what
someone says when they say that Theaetetus sits. Russell states repeatedly what
would be missing from an account according to which this understanding
consists in bringing to consciousness Theaetetus and the property of Sitting.
In order to understand what someone says when they say that Socrates precedes
Plato, Russell tells us, it is necessary to understand ‘how Socrates and Plato and
7 See Candlish (1996) for an account of Russell’s growing awareness of this problem as distinct
from the problem of order.
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“precedes” are to be combined’ (Russell 1984, 99). Understanding the state-
ment ‘a is similar to b’ ‘would not be possible unless we knew how they [a,
b and similarity] are to be put together’ (Russell 1984, 101). In order to
understand the proposition ‘A precedes B’, in addition to knowing what is
meant by the words that occur in it, ‘it is also necessary to know how these three
terms [A, B and preceding] are to be combined’ (Russell 1984, 111). And in
order to understand ‘A and B are similar’ ‘we must know what is supposed to
be done with A and B and similarity, i.e. what it is for two terms to have
a relation’ (Russell 1984, 116).
Returning to our example, in order to understand the proposition that
Theaetetus sits, in addition to bringing to consciousness Theaetetus and the
property of Sitting, I must grasp how these two items are represented as
combined by the proposition – how they would have to be combined in order
for the proposition to be true, in order for things to be as the proposition
represents them as being. I am going to refer to this as the mode-of-
combination problem. It is the problem of explaining how, in an episode of
understanding, the subject is aware of the way in which the items the proposi-
tion is about are represented by the proposition as combined with one another –
of how these items would have to be combined with one another in order for the
proposition to be true.
There’s one approach to the mode-of-combination problem that generates
an inﬁnite regress parallel to the regress that we face in the metaphysical
version of the problem of predication. On this approach, modes of combina-
tion are entities that we are capable of bringing to consciousness. We can
bring to consciousness, for example, the relation of Monadic Instantiation,
and the mode-of-combination problem is solved for subject-predicate propo-
sitions by reference to awareness of Monadic Instantiation. On this approach,
I understand the proposition that Theaetetus sits by bringing to consciousness
not only Theaetetus and the property of Sitting, but also the relation of
Monadic Instantiation. By grasping this relation, I become aware of how
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting are represented as combined with one
another by the proposition – of how they have to be combined in order for the
proposition to be true.
But this proposal doesn’t remove the problem. Bringing to consciousness
Theaetetus, the property of Sitting and the relation of Monadic Instantiation
doesn’t sufﬁce for representing in mind Theaetetus as sitting, and hence for
understanding the proposition that Theaetetus sits. The additional object of
awareness doesn’t improve matters, as a subject who has brought to conscious-
ness these three items might not grasp the way in which they have to be
combined in order for Theaetetus to sit – in order for the proposition to be
true: the pair consisting of Theaetetus and the property of Sitting has to
instantiate the relation of Monadic Instantiation.
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We could try to remedy the situation by introducing an additional object of
awareness. What needs to happen to Theaetetus, the property of Sitting and the
relation of Monadic Instantiation in order for Theaetetus to sit is that the
particular and the property need to bear the relation of Dyadic Instantiation to
the relation of Monadic Instantiation. This might suggest that the problem
would be solved if we construed understanding of the proposition that
Theaetetus sits as involving awareness of the three items already considered
and the relation of Dyadic Instantiation. But this leaves us in the same situation
that we faced before. We are off on a regress. Adding objects of awareness that
embody modes of combination does not solve the problem. A different
approach is needed.
Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge in the autumn of 1911, with the intention
of studying with Russell. He stayed in Cambridge until October 1913. In this
period, Russell and Wittgenstein developed a famously intense personal and
philosophical relationship. We know that Russell discussed with Wittgenstein
the views that he was developing in May 1913 in the Theory of Knowledge
manuscript. And Russell’s ideas had a profound inﬂuence on Wittgenstein’s
conception of the problems. Wittgenstein encountered the semantic version of
the problem of predication in the form that Russell had given to it in May 1913,
i.e. as the mode-of-combination problem. I am going to argue that a central
component of the position advanced inWittgenstein’s Tractatus should be seen
as Wittgenstein’s proposal for dealing with the problem.
In Theory of Knowledge, Russell sought to solve the mode-of-combination
problem by introducing forms in his analysis of understanding.8 But
Wittgenstein’s pre-Tractarian manuscripts show that, for Wittgenstein,
Russell’s appeal to forms was fraught with difﬁculties. Wittgenstein thought
that the items that Russell identiﬁed with forms (full existential general-
isations) couldn’t play the role that Russell had assigned to them in his theory
of understanding, and, more generally, no entity could play this role. As early
as the ‘Notes on Logic’, dictated in October 1913, Wittgenstein’s verdict on
Russell’s appeal to forms is unambiguously negative: ‘There is no thing
which is the form of a proposition … This goes against Russell’s theory of
judgment’ (Potter 2009, 282). Wittgenstein’s discussion of these ideas clearly
indicates, ﬁrst, that Wittgenstein was concerned with the problem that Russell
had tried to solve with forms and, second, that Wittgenstein was convinced
that forms could not be invoked in the solution to the problem.
What is needed is a way of construing the subject’s awareness of how, in our
example, Theaetetus and the property of Sitting are represented as combined by
the proposition that Theaetetus sits. As we’ve just seen, this cannot be achieved
8 Notice, however, that Russell’s proposal was not the regress-generating strategy that we have just
considered. See Zalabardo (2015, §1.7) for details.
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by thinking of the mode of combination as an object and including awareness of
this object in our account of understanding. Another approach is required.
We get a suggestion of how this can be achieved if we go back to the
unworkable account of judgment with which we started, according to which
judgment is a relation between the mind and a fact. If the mind has the power to
bring to consciousness the fact that Theaetetus sits and its structure, under-
standing of the proposition that Theaetetus sits can be explained in this way.
By bringing to consciousness the fact that Theaetetus sits, the subject will
grasp, not only the constituents of the fact, but also the way in which they are
combined with one another in the fact. And this grasp doesn’t lead to an inﬁnite
regress. We are not invoking a third item, whose connection to the previous two
would then have to be grasped. The subject doesn’t grasp a mode of combina-
tion in isolation. She grasps an actual combination and abstracts from this the
way in which its constituents are combined.
This model of understanding offers a solution to the mode-of-combination
problem, but, as we have seen, it cannot serve as our general account of
understanding, since it’s only applicable to the understanding of true proposi-
tions. The proposition that Theaetetus ﬂies cannot be understood in this way.
This would require bringing to consciousness the fact that Theaetetus ﬂies, but
since the proposition is false there is no such fact. The item that would need to
be brought to consciousness in order to understand the proposition in this way
simply doesn’t exist.
Nevertheless, a modiﬁcation of this approach will give rise to an account of
understanding that is equally applicable to true and false propositions. Notice that
the source of the problemwith false propositions is that the fact grasp of which is
supposed to produce understanding is the same as the fact that would make the
proposition true. But this is not an essential component of the solution to the
mode-of-combination problem. For the purpose of solving this problem, under-
standing can be taken to consist in grasp of any other fact, provided that its
constituents are combined with one another in the way in which objects would
have to be combined in order for the proposition to be true. Thus, for example, by
grasping the fact that Socrates stutters and its structure, we grasp the way in
which Theaetetus and the property of Flying would have to be combined in order
for the proposition that Theaetetus ﬂies to be true – they would have to be
combined in the same way in which the constituents of the fact that Socrates
stutters are actually combined with one another in that fact. The crucial conse-
quence of this move is that the resulting account is applicable to the under-
standing of false propositions as well as true propositions. The fact that I grasp
when I understand the proposition has to obtain, but the fact on whose obtaining
the truth value of the proposition depends may or may not obtain.
Hence we have reached an account according to which we understand
a proposition by grasping a fact whose constituents are combined with one
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another in the same way in which objects in the world (the referents of the
terms in the proposition) would have to be combined with one another in order
for the proposition to be true. This account of understanding is, I submit, the
central idea of Wittgenstein’s picture theory of representation. The pictures,
thoughts and propositions of the Tractatus are the facts that we grasp, on this
account, in episodes of understanding.9 The claim that propositions represent
pictorially is Wittgenstein’s solution to the semantic version of the problem of
predication.
Wittgenstein states very clearly that what he is calling pictures are facts (TLP
2.141), and that the advantage of using facts to represent the world as being
a certain way is that the constituents of a fact are combined with one another in
a certain way (TLP 2.14, 2.031), i.e., that the fact exempliﬁes a mode of
combination. This circumstance enables us to use a fact to represent things as
combined in a certain way:
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate
way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Hence, by using a fact to represent things as being a certain way, we bring
a mode of combination into the representational episode – we represent things
in the world as combined with one another in the same way in which the
constituents of the depicting fact are combined with one another. And this is
achieved without generating an inﬁnite regress. We don’t answer the question
of how we are representing objects in the world as combined with one another
by identifying an additional object that plays the role of a mode of combination,
whose combination with the objects it’s supposed to combine would then need
to be grasped. We are answering the question by singling out an instance of the
mode of combination in question: we represent objects in the world as com-
bined with one another like that – as the constituents of the depicting fact are
combined with one another.
For pictorial representation, then, we can provide a satisfactory explanation
of how the way in which objects are represented as combined with one another
is brought into representational episodes. Hence, if mental and linguistic
representation followed the pictorial model, we would have at our disposal
a solution to the mode-of-combination problem. And this is precisely what
Wittgenstein goes on to claim. Thoughts are pictures of a certain kind (TLP 3),
and propositions give expression to thoughts (TLP 3.1). Propositional repre-
sentation is then directly characterised as following the pictorial model:
3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in
a determinate relation to one another. A propositional sign is a fact.
9 The main ideas of this account of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s picture theory and
Russell’s theory of judgment were ﬁrst presented by David Pears. See Pears (1977).
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Propositions, like all pictures, are facts whose constituents (the words) are
combined with one another in a certain way, and they represent objects in the
world (the referents of the words) as combined with one another in that same
way. Commentators have often been puzzled by how the pictorial model could
apply to linguistic representation. If we think of ‘Theaetetus criticises Socrates’
as a fact, whose constituents are combined with one another in a certain way, it
is natural to think of it as the fact, say, that ‘Theaetetus’, ‘criticises’, and
‘Socrates’ are concatenated with each other in this order. But then it seems
that ‘Theaetetus criticises Socrates’ cannot represent Theaetetus as criticising
Socrates. All it can do is represent Theaetetus, the relation of Criticising and
Socrates as concatenated with one another in that order. However, this char-
acterisation of the situation doesn’t take account of two important points.
First, if a proposition is to represent the referents of its constituents as
combined with one another in the same way as the constituents are combined
in the proposition, then the constituents of the proposition have to have the
same combinatorial possibilities as their respective referents. Hence in
a proposition that represents Theaetetus as criticising Socrates, the representa-
tives of Theaetetus and Socrates have to be particulars, e.g., the words
‘Theaetetus’ and ‘Socrates’, but the representative of the relation of
Criticising has to be a binary relation – e.g., the relation ρ that x bears to
y when x is to the left of y with the word ‘criticises’ between them. Then the fact
with which ‘Theaetetus criticises Socrates’ has to be identiﬁed is not the fact
that ‘Theaetetus’, ‘criticises’, and ‘Socrates’ are concatenated with each other
in this order, but rather the fact that ‘Theaetetus’ ρ ‘Socrates’.
This might not seem to be much progress, since all we seem to be able to
depict with this fact is Theaetetus standing to the left of Socrates with the word
‘criticises’ between them. But here we would be assuming that the constituents
of ‘Theaetetus’ ρ ‘Socrates’ are ‘Theaetetus’ and ‘Socrates’, while ρ is the way
in which they are combined. We avoid this pitfall if we take account of
the second point: thoughts and propositions are pictures of a special kind –
they are logical pictures. This means, in a nutshell, that the way in which its
constituents are combined with one another is a logical mode of combination,
with every non-logical aspect of the proposition treated as a constituent. On this
construal, the constituents of ‘Theaetetus’ ρ ‘Socrates’ are ‘Theaetetus’,
‘Socrates’ and ρ, put together by the logical relation of binary instantiation –
i.e., ‘Theaetetus’ bearing ρ to ‘Socrates’. Now, if ‘Theaetetus’ stands for
Theaetetus, ‘Socrates’ for Socrates and ρ for the relation of Criticising,
‘Theaetetus’ ρ ‘Socrates’ will represent Theaetetus, Socrates and the relation
of Criticising as combined with one another in the same way in which the
constituents of the proposition are combined with one another. In this way, it
will represent Theaetetus as criticising Socrates, as desired. I take this to be the
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account of how propositions represent that Wittgenstein offers in the following
section of the Tractatus:
3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’ we
ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’10
I want to highlight one controversial aspect of this construal of
Wittgenstein’s views. If Wittgenstein was trying to solve the mode-of-
combination problem, his goal was to explain how to bring into representa-
tional episodes awareness of how objects in the world are represented as
combined – of how they would have to be combined for things to be as they
are represented as being. Read in this way, Wittgenstein’s position is that we
bring the mode of combination to consciousness by grasping the fact that we
use as a picture and its structure – the way in which its constituents are
combined with one another. But what form is this grasp supposed to take?
One thing seems clear: if this grasp could only take the form of pictorial
representation (a picture of a picture), we would be off on a new regress.11
The proposal is only viable if it presupposes a more basic form of grasp of facts
and their structure – one that isn’t pictorial in nature. I want to close my
discussion of Wittgenstein by suggesting that this more basic type of grasp is
provided in Wittgenstein’s framework by the notion of showing. A picture, he
tells us at TLP 2.172, ‘displays’ (aufweisen) its pictorial form. Our access to
logical form is described in similar terms at TLP 4.121: Logical form is
‘mirrored’ (spiegeln) in propositions, it ‘expresses itself’ (sich ausdrücken) in
language. Propositions ‘show’ (zeigen), ‘display’ (aufweisen) the form of
reality. And the same mode of access is invoked to explain our grasp of the
pairings of the constituents of the picturing fact with the objects they stand for:
‘one proposition “fa” shows that the object a occurs in its sense’ (TLP 4.1211).
On the reading that I have sketched, I would grasp the fact that I use as a picture,
its structure, and the pairings of its constituents with their referents, with the
faculty that enables me to be a recipient of what is shown. This type of grasp is
not explained, but presupposed in Wittgenstein’s proposal. It should be clear
however that presupposing this kind of grasp doesn’t make picturing redun-
dant. What we are presupposing is a faculty of grasping actually obtaining facts
and their structure, whereas what we are explaining in terms of this faculty is
grasp of combinations that may or may not obtain – the kind of grasp of
Theaetetus as ﬂying that enables us to understand the proposition that
10 For this construal of Wittgenstein’s notion of logical picturing, see Zalabardo (2015, §2.5). See
also Peter Long’s illuminating exegesis of TLP 3.1432 (Long 1969).
11 And, in any case, Wittgenstein doesn’t think that the way in which the constituents of
a proposition are combined with one another can be represented with propositions. See
TLP 4.12.
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Theaetetus ﬂies, or judge that he does, even if, as a matter of fact, he’s never left
the surface of the Earth.12
4 Burge’s Fregean Solution
Before we turn to Davidson’s own approach to the problem, I’d like to consider
brieﬂy a solution that Tyler Burge claims to ﬁnd in Frege’s work. In a highly
critical discussion of Davidson’s ideas on the problem of predication, Burge
has claimed that Frege’s semantics offer a satisfactory solution of the semantic
version of the problem. Burge disagrees with Davidson’s claim that “associat-
ing predicates with objects such as universals, properties, relations, or sets …
will always lead to an inﬁnite regress” (Davidson 2005, 143). Burge agrees that
pairing predicates with universals cannot be the whole solution to the problem,
but he thinks that pairing predicates with universals can be part of a satisfactory
solution. What generates the regress, for Burge, is not the appeal to universals,
but the assimilation of the relationship between predicates and universals to the
relationship between singular terms and their referents: ‘The regress gets
started if the syntactic and semantical roles of a predicate are assimilated to
those of a singular term. It is absolutely essential to any solution that this
assimilation be rejected’ (Burge 2007, 590). We avoid the regress if we
recognise that a predicate doesn’t simply denote a property. In addition, the
predicate of a subject-predicate sentence attributes the property to an
individual:
The semantical relation between predicate and property is only an aspect of predication.
Let us say that the predicate indicates (or predicatively denotes) the property or relation.
Beyond indication, predication also constitutively involves a capacity for application or
attribution of the property to the individual. Thus predication involves both indication
and application of what is indicated to something further. (Burge 2007, 593)13
Now, the Russellian construal of the problem of predication that I have been
discussing here (the mode-of-combination problem) is signiﬁcantly different
from the construal of the problem that Burge considers, and it may well be that
on Burge’s construal of the problem, his proposal offers a satisfactory solution.
But the question I want to ask is whether Burge’s proposal offers a promising
avenue for dealing with the mode-of-combination problem.
We can easily adapt Burge’s proposal to provide an account of Russell’s
phenomenon of understanding. An episode of understanding of the proposition
that Theaetetus sits would involve bringing to consciousness two items –
Theaetetus and the property of Sitting – but each of these items would be brought
12 On this reading, the faculty of grasping what’s shown would be playing forWittgenstein the role
that the notion of acquaintance played for Russell. See Zalabardo (2015, §2.11) for details.
13 See also Wright (1998); MacBride (2006, 2011); Liebesman (2015).
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to consciousness in a different way. Theaetetus would be brought to conscious-
ness in a purely denotational mode, while the property of Sitting would be
brought to consciousness in a mixed mode, which includes both denotation and,
crucially, attribution of what is denoted to something else – to the item
(Theaetetus) brought to consciousness in the episode of understanding in
a purely denotational mode.
Now, if this proposal is going to offer a satisfactory solution to the mode-of-
combination problem, the attributive character of the subject’s awareness of the
property of Sitting would have to allow her to bring to consciousness the way in
which the property and the individual are represented as combined – the way in
which they would have to be combined in order for the proposition to be true.
Attribution, in other words, would have to make the subject aware of the relevant
mode of combination. Hence the proposal would have to be supplemented with
an account of how attribution achieves this. One possibility would be to contend
that the attributive aspect of predicative awareness ensures that when a property
is brought to consciousness in this mode, the relation of Monadic Instantiation is
simultaneously present to the mind. It should be clear, however, that this
approach would take us back to the regress-generating proposal considered
above. To provide a promising solution to the mode-of-combination problem,
the Burgean proposal would have to be supplemented with an alternative account
of how the attributive aspect of predicative denotation furnishes the subject with
the requisite awareness. I don’t ﬁnd in Burge’s discussion of the problem of
predication any suggestion as to how this could be achieved.
5 Davidson’s Theory of Judgment
In the ﬁnal chapter of Truth and Predication, Davidson puts forward a solution
to the semantic version of the problem. Davidson’s solution is based on a lesson
we can learn from Tarski’s work on truth:
for a language with anything like the expressive power of a natural language, the class of
true sentences cannot be characterized without introducing a relation like satisfaction,
which connects words (singular terms, predicates) with objects. (Davidson 2005, 30)
This indispensable role of the semantic properties of predicates and singular
terms in the speciﬁcation of the truth conditions of the sentences of a language
is supposed to explain their contribution to the power of sentences to represent
the world as being a certain way:
If we can show that our account of the role of predicates is part of an explanation of the
fact that sentences containing a given predicate are true or false, then we have incorpo-
rated our account of predicates into an explanation of the most obvious sense in which
sentences are uniﬁed, and so we can understand how, by using a sentence, we can make
assertions and perform speech acts. (Davidson 2005, 155)
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It is not at all obvious how Davidson’s solution is to be understood. The answer
to this question can be expected to depend on the speciﬁc construal of the
problem we focus on, and I think we can cast some light on Davidson’s
proposal in relationship to Russell’s project of explicating the phenomenon
of judgment and the version of the problem of predication that it faces.
As we’ve seen, the goal of Russell’s theories of judgment was to explain
what has to be the case in order for a subject S to judge that p or, later, to
understand the proposition that p. Speciﬁcally, his goal was to explain how
S has to be related to the world in order for her judgment to have the content that
p or for her to understand the proposition as having the content that p. From
1910, Russell thought that in order to achieve this the relevant mental episodes
would have to be construed as involving a relation (acquaintance) to predicates
and universals – to the items that would need to be combined into a unit in order
for things to be as represented by the judgment or the proposition being
understood. Davidson is unquestionably opposed to this strategy. What I
want to consider is what alternative approach to Russell’s problem Davidson
could be seen as advocating.
Throughout his discussion of the semantic version of the problem of pre-
dication, Davidson blames the difﬁculty on the appeal to universals as referents
of predicates. This suggests that the aspect of Russell’s multiple-relation
approach that Davidson would take exception to is the presence of universals
among the worldly relata of episodes of judgment or understanding. If this is so,
then a modiﬁcation of Russell’s approach that avoided appealing to universals
would meet with Davidson’s approval. This can be achieved with the help of
Tarski’s notion of satisfaction. If we focus on subject-predicate sentences,
obviating the need to treat inﬁnite sequences of entities as satisﬁers, satisfaction
is a relation that particulars bear to predicates: a particular a satisﬁes a predicate
P just in case P is true of a – i.e. just in case a sentence in which P is ascribed to
a singular term referring to a would be true. Using this notion we can give the
semantics of ‘Theaetetus sits’ without invoking a universal as the referent of
‘sits’. The worldly relata of the sentence would be the referent of ‘Theaetetus’
and those individuals that satisfy ‘sits’. The sentence would be true just in case
the referent of the singular term is among the individuals that satisfy the
predicate. On this account, there are no universals among the worldly relata
of the sentence.
We can try to use these ideas to produce a version of Russell’s approach that
doesn’t postulate universal relata for episodes of judgment or understanding.
On this position, a predicative judgment would be connected to the world by
two relations. On the one hand, it would be connected to an individual by the
singular-reference relation. On the other hand, it would be connected by
the satisfaction relation to a manifold of individuals – those that satisfy the
predicate that would ﬁgure in a sentence expressing the judgment.
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It is not clear that this move would produce a promising theory of judgment.
Notice that the relations of singular reference and satisfaction would have to
enable the subject to bring to consciousness their world-side relata. For exam-
ple, when a subject judges that Theaetetus sits, she would have to have present
to the mind Theaetetus and, instead of the property of sitting, the manifold of
sitting individuals. But the new requirement is highly implausible. Surely
judging that Theaetetus sits cannot require bringing to consciousness every
sitting individual.
However, even leaving this difﬁculty to one side, it should be clear that
Davidson would not endorse this approach. This would involve explaining the
truth conditions of sentences in terms of the satisfaction conditions of predi-
cates, but it is clear that, for Davidson, the order of explanation proceeds in the
opposite direction:
Which of the two semantic concepts, satisfaction or truth, we take as basic is, from
a formal point of view, open to choice. Truth, as Tarski showed, is easily deﬁned on the
basis of satisfaction; but, alternatively, satisfaction can be taken to be whatever relation
yields a correct account of truth … The second is, I think, the right view. (Davidson
2005, 34–35)
If, as this passage and others14 indicate, the satisfaction relation is deﬁned as
whatever individual-predicate relation produces the right truth conditions for
sentences, which truth conditions a sentence has cannot be deﬁned in terms of
the satisfaction conditions of the predicates that ﬁgure in it, on pain of
circularity.
It should be equally clear that Davidson would not support either a return to
Russell’s dual-relation approach. He certainly doesn’t see his endorsement of
Tarski’s theory of truth as carrying a commitment to this approach:
Tarski provides no entities at all to which sentences correspond or which sentences
name, picture, or otherwise represent. No facts appear in the ofﬁcial apparatus, nor do
propositions, either as the meanings of sentences or as half-extensional, half-intensional
entities in the world as in Russell’s early theory. (Davidson 2005, 155)
Davidson’s solution doesn’t postulate entities that could play the role of
worldly relata in a dual-relation theory.
It seems, then, that Davidson would oppose all the strategies with which
Russell attempted to explain how a subject has to be related to the world in
order for her judgment to have the content that p or for her to understand
a proposition as having the content that p. And I want to suggest that he is not
offering an alternative strategy for explaining these subject-world relations.
Davidson doesn’t think that such an explanation is to be had. Notice that if we
had an account of the semantic relations between sentences or judgments and
14 Davidson (2005, 35–36, 155).
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bits of the world, we should be able to derive from it a pairing of true sentences
or judgments with facts. However, in Truth and Predication Davidson argues
forcefully against the idea of a correspondence of this kind: ‘there is nothing
interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond’ (Davidson 2005,
39), since ‘if true sentences correspond to anything, they all correspond to the
same thing’ (Davidson 2005, 40). So, for Davidson, it’s not possible to provide
an informative pairing of true sentences or judgments with the facts that make
them true. But if this is not possible, then, a fortiori, it’s not possible to have an
informative account of the relations between sentences or judgments (true or
false) and the world from which the former obtain their content. We have to
conclude that, for Davidson, it’s not possible to explain these relations between
mind or language and the world. His ‘solution’ to the problem of predication is
not a strategy for overcoming an obstacle to the provision of this explanation.
It follows that, according to Davidson, linguistic meaning and mental con-
tent cannot be explained in terms of relations between linguistic items or
mental episodes and the world. How then is he proposing to explain these
phenomena? I want to suggest that, in the case of linguistic meaning on which
Davidson concentrates, his proposal is to explicate the phenomenon in terms of
linguistic use.15
He expresses the point clearly in the following explanation of what is
missing in the Tarskian truth theory with which he proposes to specify the
semantics of a language:
What is missing is the connection with the users of language. Nothing would count as
a sentence, and the concept of truth would have no application, if there were no creatures
who used sentences by uttering or inscribing tokens of them. Any complete account of
the concept of truth must relate it to actual linguistic intercourse. (Davidson 2005, 36)
Elsewhere he states explicitly that his views on the connection between truth
and meaning are not in conﬂict with a use-based semantics:
What is clear is that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would be
true understands that sentence, and if the sentence has a truth value (true, false or
perhaps neither) then someone who does not know under what conditions it would be
true doesn’t understand it. This simple claim doesn’t rule out an account of meaning
which holds that sentences mean what they do because of how they are used; it may be
that they are used as they are because of their truth conditions, and they have the truth
conditions they do because of how they are used. (Davidson 2000, 70)
However, the idea that meaning should be explained in terms of use is often
seen as enjoining an epistemic view of truth, according to which we can specify
in terms of beliefs or other cognitive attitudes what has to be the case in order
for a sentence to be true. AndDavidson’s rejection of this view is unambiguous.
15 For an application of these ideas to mental content see Davidson (2001b).
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Here is his verdict on the version of the view according to which truth is
warranted assertibility:
I respect this idea for the same reason I respect closely related pragmatic theories,
because it relates truth to human attitudes like belief, intention and desire, and I believe
any complete account of truth must do this. But theirs cannot be the right way to express
the relation. For either the conditions of warranted assertability are made so strong that
they include truth itself, in which case the account is circular, or circularity is avoided by
making the conditions explicit, and it then becomes clear that a fully warranted assertion
may be false. (Davidson 2000, 67–68)
But his rejection of epistemic accounts of truth doesn’t lead Davidson to give
up on the project of explicating truth and meaning in terms of use. His hope is
that there is a way of achieving this that doesn’t take the form of an epistemic
view of truth:
there must be some connection [between belief and truth] if we are to relate the truth of
utterances to their use. The question is what that connection can be. (Davidson 2005, 42)
Davidson is certainly not alone in thinking that we can explain truth in terms of
use without identifying truth with warranted assertibility. The view has been
eloquently defended by Huw Price:
pragmatists have often ignored the resources of their own theoretical standpoint—
even, in a sense, their own principles—in seeking to equate truth with something like
warranted assertibility. A better alternative, in my view, is to seek to explain in
pragmatic terms why our notion of truth does not line up neatly with warranted
assertibility—in other words, to explain what practical use we have for a stronger
notion. (Price 2011a, 16)
Advocates of epistemic accounts of truth seek to replace the analysis of truth as
correspondence with an alternative analysis in terms of use. According to Price,
their mistake is to think that an analysis is needed. Rather than trying to provide
an analysis of the notion, the pragmatist should simply “investigate its function
and genealogy” (Price 2011b, 167). Robert Brandom characterises the pragma-
tist methodology in similar terms, as “beginning with a story about the practice
or activity of applying concepts, and elaborating on that basis an understanding
of conceptual content” (Brandom 2000, 4).
I want to end by suggesting that Davidson’s position ﬁts nicely in this
methodological mould.16 The account of the practice of interpretation offered
in Chapter 3 of Truth and Predication, and the related account he offers
16 In a note on the manuscript that the editors have included as a footnote at the end of Chapter 3,
Davidson writes: “I want to make clear that my ‘solution’ isn’t a basic one. It is an alternative to
deﬂationary, epistemological correspondence theories not in proposing a better deﬁnition (or
short summary) but in suggesting a different approach which relates the concept of truth to other
concepts” (Davidson 2005, 75).
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elsewhere of the emergence of thought and linguistic meaning,17 is precisely
what is required for an account of semantic phenomena along the lines of the
brand of pragmatism advocated by Price and Brandom, among others.18
If Davidson was indeed pursuing this pragmatist methodology, his explanation
of semantic phenomena would not require specifying relations between lin-
guistic or mental items and the world that endow the former with their semantic
properties. Since the problem of predication arises within this now redundant
enterprise, Davidson’s pragmatism would have a good claim to count as his
solution to the problem.19
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